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INTENT TO DEFRAUD
To make a misrepresentation tortious it must be made with an
intent to defraud. The question to be discussed in this article
is the exact nature of that intent.
Intent or intention is a state of mind. Therefore its actual
existence is really always a question of fact, though that fact, like
any other fact, may be the subject of legal presumptions. This
applies to intent to defraud. But the question whether a given
state of mind, proved to exist, amounts to intent to defraud, is
one of law.
Intention is of conduct or of consequences. Intention of con-
duct is a state of mind in which a person, whether or not he is
actually doing anything at the time, looks forward to something
to be done by him in the future, as where a burglar breaks and
enters a dwelling with an intent to steal after he gets in. This
kind of intention does not concern us here. Intent to defraud
is intention of consequences. The word intent or intention will
hereinafter be used only in the latter sense.
Intention of consequences is a state of mind in which a person
at the time of doing an act looks forward to some consequence
that may flow from his act.
Intention includes expectation of the consequence, i. e., belief
that there is some probability that the act will produce the con-
sequence. The degree of probability may seem to the actor very
small; it is certainly not necessary that the happening of the
consequence shall seem to him more likely than not. A' may
shoot B intending to hit him, though he knows perfectly well
that, because of B's distance or his own want of marksmanship,
the chance of hitting him is not one in a hundred. Any degree
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of believed probability that is sufficient to lead to the doing the
act is enough.
Austin says that expectation alone is sufficient for intention.
This would compel us to say that a surgeon who performs a
desperate operation intends to kill his patient. Perhaps he did
not clearly distinguish between intention and recklessness or neg-
ligence, which distinction will presently be pointed out; or he
may have been misled by the Latin etymology of the word. The
examples he gives are cases where intention in the proper sense
would not be necessary to liability. In our law there is no doubt
that desire for the consequence is essential to its being intended;
though there are at least dicta to the contrary. This is shown
by the cases hereinafter cited to the effect that intention in the
proper sense is necessary to intend to defraud. For instance, in
Peek v. Gurney,' the defendants must have anticipated that
some one would act on their representation as the plaintiff did,
but they did not desire that, and therefore did not intend it.
When any question arises as to the existence of intention in a
given case, the doubt is usually about the desire, not about the
expectation.
Those two elements, expectation and desire, make up what
may be called simple intention. But there is sometimes a third
element, namely, knowledge, or at least belief, of the existence
of facts that make the conduct wrongful; not knowledge of the
rule of law that forbids it. When such knowledge or belief is
present, the intention is culpable. Thus if A, cutting timber on
his own land, by mistake cuts over on to B's adjoining land, does
he intend to cut B's trees? If simple intention is meant, yes.
He intends to cut the very trees that he does cut, and they are
in fact B's trees. If culpable intention is meant, no. He is
ignorant of the fact that makes his act wrongful, the position
of the boundary line. In that sense, he intends to cut only his
own trees. So if A marries B's wife, supposing that B has
died, he has a simple intent to marry another's wife. But if he
knows that B is living but supposes that he has a legal right to
marry her because B has deserted her, his intent is culpable.
Much confusion, at least verbal confusion, has arisen from over-
looking the distinction between simple and culpable intention.
In the law of crimes, intention usually means culpable intention;
in the law of torts it may have either meaning. Intent to defraud
' See note 5.
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is culpable intention, belief of a fact, namely, that the representa-
tion is false, being an essential element in it.
Intention must be distinguished from recklessness. Reckless-
ness is where a person does something which is unreasonably
dangerous, i. e., where the probability of some injurious conse-
quence ensuing is unreasonably great, knowing that the probability
is such, knowing that he is taking an unreasonable risk of pro-
ducing such consequence, not desiring the consequence, and there-
fore not intending it, but either not caring whether it happens
or being willing for some reason of his own to take such a risk
of producing it.
Recklessness sometimes has the same legal effects as intention.
If so, it is often called intention or it is said that intention is
conclusively presumed. The maxim that a person is presumed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his conduct
is often quoted.2 Those expressions are objectionable, because
they are a misnaming of things or involve a useless and mis-
leading fiction, and because recklessness is not always legally
equivalent to intention. For convenience's sake the word wilful-
ness may be used to include culpable intention and recklessness,
both of which involve a wrong choice known to be wrong. That
is not so of simple intention, which may be a quite innocent state
of mind.
Negligence is not a state of mind at all. It is conduct which
in fact involves an unreasonably great risk of causing harm. It
is -usually due to carelessness or heedlessness, which is a state
of mind, and consists in insufficient attention to the conditions or
consequence of one's conduct. But it may be due to wilfulness,
or on the other hand to mere error of judgment, though error ofjudgment, or conduct resulting therefrom, is not per se negli-
gence. When a person is bound to use care, he must act as a
reasonable and prudent man would in his situation, he mustjudge as such a man would judge whether a given risk is unrea-
sonably great. If he is not in fact such a man, he may err and
fall into negligent conduct, though in his mind he is not careless
or wilful.
Intent to defraud, assuming for the present that the word
intent is used in its proper sense, is made up of the following
elements:
'That maxim has various other meanings, which need not be discussed
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A. Intent to make a representation, to convey an idea to
another. When the representation is made in words, there is
seldom any question as to this element. But a fraudulent mis-
representation can be made by conduct without words. In such
a case the question may arise, whether the actor really intended
to make any representation at all, whether he intended that any
one should draw from his conduct any inference as to the
existence of a fact.
B. Intent to address or direct the representation to some one.
If a misrepresentation is directed to one person, but comes to
another who is deceived by it and acts upon it to his injury, there
is no fraud against the latter. But a representation may be
directed to a class of persons and so to each individual of that
class, or even to the whole public, as in the case of a lying
advertisement.3
C. Intent that the representation bear a certain meaning,
ainounting to the assertion of a certain fact. A representation
may be capable of several meanings, in some of which it may
be false and fraudulent and in others not.
D. Knowledge that the representation, in its aforesaid mean-
ing, is false. This, as has been said, is the element that makes
the intent amount to culpable rather than to mere simple intention.
E. Intent that the addressee shall believe the representation.
F. Intent that he shall act upon it in a certain way.
G. Intent that his so acting upon it shall produce a certain
consequence. Such a consequence will hereinafter be called
objective fraud. The simple name fraud is often applied to the
intent to defraud. That is subjective fraud, a state of the actor's
mind. Objective fraud is, the effect upon another of his conduct.
The nature of objective fraud will be discussed presently.
The rule that to make a fraudulent misrepresentation tortious
it must actually be believed and acted upon is foreign to the
present discussion. Such results may be intended, though in
fact they never happen.
A to E constitute intent to deceive; when F and G are added,
there is an intent to defraud. Intent to deceive is not legally
wrongful. If a woman wears false hair or paints her face, she
may intend to deceive, but usually not to defraud any one.
Under each of the above heads, except D, the question is
whether the word intent is used in its proper sense, to connote
desire as well as expectation, or' in a looser sense; whether in
Williams v. Wood, 14 Wend. 126.
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some or all of the cases something other than actual intention
may not suffice. Of course intention is enough. When that is
shown to be present, intent to defraud is proved. But often it
is recklessness rather than intention that is present, and the
question will be whether that is legally equivalent to intention.
A similar question may arise as to carelessness, or even as to
negligence, which, as has been said, is not a state of mind at all.
A. Here intention seems to mean intention in the proper sense;
mere recklessness as to what conclusions others may draw from
one's conduct is probably not enough.4 But the authorities are
not perfectly explicit. However, when a representation is implied
by law from the nature or circumstances of a transaction, there
need not be any actual intention to make it, e. g. when a banker
by receiving a deposit impliedly represents that he is solvent.
B. Here it seems to be settled in England that intention is
necessary, as a general rule, and that recklessness as to whether
the representation will reach some one for whom it was not
strictly intended is not enough.
The defendants, the directors of a company, issued a false and
fraudulent prospectus to induce the public to subscribe for stock.
It was widely circulated and came into the hands of the plaintiff,
who on the strength of it bought some of the company's stock,
not from the company itself but from individual holders of it.
Held: the defendants were not guilty of any fraud upon the
plaintiff. They did not intend to make any representation to
buyers of the stock in the market, but only to persons who might
subscribe for stock and take it directly from the company.5
Here the defendants must have known that the prospectus would
come into the hands of buyers; so that their conduct was at least
reckless as to the plaintiff. The decision seems to mean that
recklessness is not equivalent to intention here. Perhaps, how-
ever, the prospectus should be considered to have been directed
to the public generally, and therefore to the plaintiff, but the
defendants did not intend to have it acted upon in the manner in
which the plaintiff did act upon it. If so, the case falls under F.
In the United States the rule is perhaps doubtful. It is not
always clear from the decisions whether the court thought that
recklessness as to the person to whom the representation might
come was equivalent to intention, or that there was in fact in the
'Austin v. Great West Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 442; Crawshay v. Thiomp-
son, 4 M. & G. 357, 5 Sc. N. R. 562, 11 L. J. C. P. 301.
'Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377.
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particular case an intention to direct it to the person who received
and acted upon it.6
When the representation is made to one person to be repeated
by him to another, it may be directed to the latter. In this case
some authorities at least hold that it is not necessary that the
maker of the representation should actually desire the repetition.
It has been held sufficient that he makes it for the purpose of
enabling the immediate addressee to repeat it if he chooses to,
though the maker does not care at all whether he repeats it
or not.
7
If the maker of the representation does not intend that it shall
be repeated and does not make it for the purpose of enabling the
immediate addressee to repeat it, but believes that the latter
intends to and will repeat it, it seems doubtful whether the
representation should be deemed to be directed to the person to
whom it is repeated. No express authority has been found,
except in one class of cases. It has been considered that a per-
son who sells a dangerous thing with a representation to the
vendee that it is safe, knowing that it is to be used by a third
person to whom the vendee will hand it over for use, thus
impliedly repeating to him the vendor's representation, may be
liable to such third person, if he is injured by it, for fraud, not
merely for negligence. Here the vendor has no desire beyond
merely to sell the thing; he does not care what the vendee does
with it.8
But it has also been considered that in such cases the true
ground of action was negligence rather than fraud.9
'Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y. 454, 20 N. E. 376; Hindinan v. First
National Bank, 112 Fed. 931, 5o C. C. A. 623, 57 L. R. A. 1O8; Morgan
v. Skiddy, 62 N. Y. 319; Prewitt v. Trimble, 92 Ky. 176, 36 Am. St.
Rep. 586, 17 S. W. 356.
'Stony Creek Woolen Co. v. Smalley, iii Mich. 321, 69 N. W. 722;
Peabody Building & L. Assn. v. Houseman, 69 Pa. St. 261, 33 Am. Rep.
757; Swift v. Winterbothain, L. R. 8 Q. B. 244; reversed on other grounds
L. R. 9 Q. B. 301.
'Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 6 L. J. Ex. 137, 4 M. & W. 337,
7 L. J. Ex. 387. See also Huset v. J. J. Case T. M. Co., 12o Fed. 865,
57 C. C. A. 237, 61 L. R. A. 303; Woodward v. Miller, 119 Ga. 618, IOO
Am. St. Rep. 188, 46 S. E. 847; Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing
Assn., 211 Mass. 449, 98 N. E. 95; Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co.,
183 N. Y. 78, 111 Am. St. Rep. 691, 75 N. E. 1o98, 5 Ann. Cas. 124.
'Wells v. Cook, io Oh. St. 67, 88 Am. Dec. 436; Heaven v. Pender,
L R. x Ex. i.
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The mere fact that, as the maker of the representation knows,
the immediate addressee will be able to repeat it to a third person
and so defraud the latter, will not be sufficient to charge the
maker with an intent to have it repeated. 10
In some cases, e. g. of a representation made to an agent about
his principal's business or statements made by a person to a
mercantile agency about his own financial condition, there seem
to be legal presumptions that repetition is intended.
When a representation is communicated through one person to
another in such circumstances that it can be deemed to be directed
to the latter, it makes no difference through how many persons
or by how circuitous a route it reaches the latter; nor need there
be any intent to deceive any of the intermediate persons through
whom it passes."
C. When words are used to express the intent of the parties
to a juristic act, e. g. a contract or a statute, the law recognizes
a kind of artificial legal meaning, which is taken as the true
meaning, which is a question for the court. That ineaning is
meant in a general way to coincide with the intended meaning;
and it is often said that the interpretation and construction of
the words by the court is for the purpose of finding out what
the parties intended. But the legal meaning may not in fact
agree with the intended meaning; and direct evidence of the
intended meaning is usually not admissible. Indeed there may
be no intended meaning at all. The parties may have understood
their words differently from the outset and never have intended
the same thing; or, as often happens, it may be necessary to
apply the words to some case which has arisen, which the parties
did not foresee and as to which they had no intention whatever.
But when words are used to commit a tort, as in slander or
deceit and some other cases, there is no such artificial legal
meaning. The meaning to be taken must be the intended mean-
ing, the accepted meaning, i. e. the meaning in which the addressee
actually understood the words, or a reasonable meaning-there
are two or three different kinds of reasonable meanings.
There was for some time a tendency to hold that the maker of
a representation might be responsible in an action for deceit for
"o Ware v. Brown, 2 Bond 267; Magee Furnace Co. v. LeBarron, 127
Mass. I5 ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, 8 App. Cas. 15.
'Ford v. Foster, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541, 27
Rev. Rep. 420.
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a reasonable meaning which the addressee put upon his represen-
tation, even though that was not the meaning which he intended it
to carry.1 2  This was really equivalent to making him liable for
negligence. However, it is now settled that the intended mean-
ing must be taken, i. e. the meaning that the maker of the repre-
sentation intended that the addressee should put upon it, not
some esoteric meaning that he may have contemplated in the
secret recesses of his own mind.' 3
The intended meaning is of course a question of fact, and may
be proved by the direct testimony of the maker of the representa-
tion himself, though the jury may not believe him.1 4 However,
if the representation is not really ambiguous, if it is perfectly
plain and capable of only one meaning, the court will reject
evidence of any other meaning and hold that to be its meaning;
but this rule should be applied only in a very clear case. 15
Apparently recklessness has here been held equivalent to inten-
tion; i. e., if a person makes a representation knowing that it
will probably be taken in a false sense, it is the same as though
he intended it to be so taken. 6 Under D, recklessness is no
doubt sufficient for fraud; and there seems no good reason for
any stricter rule here. The cases where a person believes his
representation false and where he believes that it will be under-
stood in a sense that will make it false, seem to be parallel. But
recklessness must be distinguished from mere negligence in mak-
ing a representation in such a form that it may be misconstrued.
D. Knowledge that the representation is false is not necessary,
though it is often said to be. Belief that it is false is undoubtedly
enough. Three states of belief are possible: (i) the maker of
the representation may believe that it is false; (2) he may have
Moens v. Heyworth, io M. & W. 147, IO L. J. Ex. 177.
"Simon v. Goodyear M. R. Shoe Co., 1o5 Fed. 573, 44 C. C. A. 612,
52 L. R. A. 745; Nash v. Minnesota T. L & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574,
47 Am. St. Rep. 489, 40 N. E. 1039, 28 L. R. A. 753; Derry v. Peek, 14
App. Cas. 337; Hays v. Meyers, 139 Ky. 440, 139 Am. St. Rep. 493, 107
S. W. 287; Smith v. Chadwick, 9 App. Cas. 187.
"Angus v. Clifford (1891), 2 Ch. 449; Nash v. Minnesota T..I. &
Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 47 Am. St. Rep. 489, 4o N. E. xO39, 28 L. R.
A. 753.
"Simon v. Goodyear M. R. Shoe Co., lo5 Fed. 575, 44 C. C. A. 612,
52 L. R. A. 745; Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459.
"'Angus v. Clifford (I89), 2 Ch. 449; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wilson., 2
Ch. D. 434.
INTENT TO DEFRAUD
no belief at all as to its truth or falsehood, in which case he makes
it recklessly; or (3) he may believe it true. (i) or (2) is
fraudulent; i e., under this head, it is enough if the false repre-
sentation is made wilfully.
17
When the maker of the representation believes it to be true,
the general rule is that it is not fraudulent; and this, even though
he had no reasonable grounds for his belief or his belief was due
to his own carelessness.' 8 A negligent or careless misrepresen-
tation is not as such fraudulent. It is sometimes said that a
person may be responsible for a false representation which he
believed to be true, if he had no reasonable grounds for his
belief. How far this may be so outside of the action for deceit,
e. g., when the question is whether a person is to be estopped or
charged with an equity because of some false statement of his,
does not concern us here.
Even in an action for deceit, the fact that the maker of a false
representation had no good ground for believing it, is evidence
that he did not in fact believe it. But it is believed that it is no
more than evidence; that statements as to its having an effect
of its own to make the representation fraudulent, are not correct.
To the above general rule there are two exceptions. If the
maker's belief is not bona fide, if he wilfully shuts his eyes for
fear of finding out something that will prevent him from believ-
ing in the truth of a representation that he is going to make, his
belief will not protect him from a charge of fraud-if indeed in
such a case he can be truly said to believe. 19 However, there is
no rule that a person who foresees that he will have to make a
representation must use active diligence to find out the truth.
His not doing so would usually amount to mere negligence,
which, as has been said above, is not equivalent to fraud.
" Sallies v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 77, 81 AtI. 974, 26 Ann. Cas. 386; Cooper
v. Schlesinger, III U. S. 148, 4 Sup. Ct. 360, 28 L. Ed. 382; Nash v.
Minnesota T. I. & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 47 Am. St. Rep. 489, 40
N. E..lO39, 28 L. Kh A. 753; Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 49
Am. St. Rep. 651, 41 N. E. 414, 29 L. R. A. 36o; Griswold v. Gibbie,
126 Pa. St. 353, 12 Am. St. Rep. 878, 17 AtI. 673; Derry v. Peek, 14 App.
Cas. 337.
'Serrano v. Miller & T. Commission Co., 117 Mo, App. 185, 93 N. W.
81o; Wakenan v. Dailey, 51 N. Y. 27, io Am. Rep. 551; Derry v. Peek,
14 App. Cas. 337; Pittsburgh Life & T. Co. v. Norther! Cent. L. Ins.
Co., 148 Fed. 674, 78 C. C. A. 4o8.
Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. St. 353, 12 Am. St. Rep. 878, 17 AtI. 675;
Edgington v. Fitz Maurice, 29 Ch. D. 459.
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Secondly, when a person makes a principal false representa-
tion which he believes true, and to support that and induce the
addressee to believe it, he makes some false collateral represen-
tation, e. g., that he has certain positive knowledge about the
matter or has made certain investigations, knowing the collateral
representation to be false or at least not believing it true, his want
of belief in the truth of the collateral representation will make
the principal one fraudulent, even though standing alone it would
not be. Such collateral representations are in certain cases
implied, and there is a multitude of decisions where makers of
false representations believed by them to be true have been held
gtilty of fraud, because of the falsity of an implied collateral
representation. 2
0
E. Whether under this head actual intention is necessary or
recklessness will suffice, no authority has been found.
F. There must not only be an intent that the representation
be acted upon, but that it be acted upon by the addressee and
in a particular way. If it is acted on by some one else or in a
different way, there is no fraud as to that.
If A makes a misrepresentation to B to induce B to buy a
house, but B does not buy, and afterwards C buys it and then
applies to B to lend him money on a mortgage of it, and B lends
on the strength of A's representation, there is no fraud by A
upon B. 21
The defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations to the plain-
tiff to induce him, as agent for his brother, to buy sheep for his
brother. The plaintiff bought them for his brother, and after-
wards, relying on the false representations, bought them for
himself from his brother. Held: he could not have an action
against the defendant for the fraud. The representations were
made to be acted upon by his brother through him as agent, not
by himself personally, and to be acted upon in a different
manner.
22
Here we have passed beyond the intent to deceive, and are deal-
ing with the intended consequences of an accomplished deception.
'Lehigh Zinc & L Co. v. Barnford, i5o U. S. 665, 14 Sup. Ct. 219, 37
L. Ed. 1215; Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 9 Am. St.
Rep. 727, I8 N. E. I68; Wakeman v. Dalley, 5i N. Y. 27, io Am. Rep.
55I; Mendenhall v. Stewart, I8 Ind. App. 262, 47 N. E. 943; Lynch v.
Mercantile Trust Co., i8 Fed. 486, 5 McCrary 623.
' Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377, per Ld. Cairnes.
' Wells v. Cook, i6 Oh. St. 67, 88 Am. Dec. 436.
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Even if intent in the, strict sense be necessary to the intent to
deceive, it does not follow that the same principles should apply
here. A person is often held responsible in law for consequences
of his conduct on the ground that they were probable, though he
had no intent to produce them or was not even reckless as to
them. When a person has.gone so far as intentionally to deceive
another in a transaction, may he not justly be held liable for even
merely probable consequences of the deception?
Undoubtedly an actual intention that the representation be
acted upon is enough. There is some authority for holding that
intention is necessary. As has been said, the decision in Peek v.
Gurney 3 might be put on that ground, and it seems to have been
considered that that was the true ground, and that intention was
necessary.24
On the other hand there seems to be some authority for the
rule that a sufficient probability that the representation will be
acted upon to render the making of it negligent will suffice.26
There are many authorities to that effect under G, and perhaps
the same principles should apply here. The present writer
remains in doubt.
G. There must be an intent that by the representation being
acted upon a consequence of that action shall be produced, which
I have called objective fraud. A-person who has suffered an
objective fraud is said to be defrauded. He is usually the
addressee himself, who acts upon the representation to his own
injury, but may be a third person to whose injury the addressee
acts.
If a person sells goods fraudulently by the use of another's
trade mark, the buyer, the addressee, who acts on the false
representation, is defrauded. So is the owner of the trade mark.
As to the addressee himself, objective fraud has the following
meaning. When a person is deceived by and acts upon a false
representation, he does or parts with something, renders some-
thing, in the expectation that he or a third person will receive
something or will accomplish something. He is defrauded when
because of the falsity of the iepresentation, of the non-existence
'
3Note 5.
2, Cheney v. Dickinson, 172 Fed. 1O9, 96 C. C. A. 314, 28 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 359.
'Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322, 64 Am. Dec. 55,; DeGraves v.
Smith, 2 Camp. 533; State v. Fox, 79 Md. 514, 47 Am. St. Rep. 424, 29
AtI. 6oi; Philpot v. Taylor, 75 Ill. 309, 20 Am. Rep. 241.
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of the fact represented to exist, he is led to render something
different from what he supposes himself to be rendering, or he
or such third person does not receive or accomplish what he
expected. The difference above spoken of is not necessarily,
though it usually is, a difference in value. The question is of
identity, not of value. A person may be defrauded in a trans-
action in which he makes a pecuniary gain. Objective fraud of
this kind, like a violation of a right, imports damage, and is a
ground for the recovery of at least nominal damages.
In case of a misrepresentation about a person's solvency, the
person defrauded gets the obligation of a person less able to
perform it than he thought.
2
6
If a person by a false representation that the title is clear is
induced to buy a piece of land that is subject to a mortgage, he
is defrauded even before the mortgage lien is enforced.27
If a man by misrepresentation is induced to marry an unchaste
woman supposing her chaste, he is defrauded. He gets a
different kind of a wife from what he expected.
2 8
The defendant induced the plaintiff to exchange a yoke of
oxen for a horse of the defendant, by a false representation that
the horse was sound. Even though unsound, the horse was
worth more than the oxen. Held: the defendant was neverthe-
less guilty of fraud .
2
When the person defrauded is not the addressee but a third
person, apparently any kind of loss or damage amounts to
objective fraud, e. g., bodily injury.3° Usually, however, the
loss is pecuniary.
The defendant was employed by a high school committee to
examine candidates for admission to the school and report the
result to the committee. The plaintiff was a candidate. The
defendant fraudulently made a false report about the plaintiff,
wherefor he was refused admission. This the court thought a
fraud upon the plaintiff. 1
Briggs v. Brushaber, 43 Mich. 330, 38 Am. Rep. 187, 5 N. W. 383.
Linn v. Green, 17 Fed. 4o7, 5 McCrary 380.
"Kujek v. Goldman, 15o N. Y. 176, 55 Am. St. Rep. 670, 44 N. E. 775,
34 L. R. A. 156.
Murray v. Jennings, 42 Conn. 9, i Am. Rep. 527.
Langridge v. Levy, note 8; State v. Fox, 79 Md.- 514, 47 Am. St.
Rep. 424, 29 AtI. 6oi.
'Hammond v. Hussey, 51 N. H. 40, 12 Am. Rep. 41.
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False representations to a person's customers to induce them
not to continue to trade with him, may be fraud upon him?2
When an objective fraud is intended, the ulterior motive of
the maker of the representation is immaterial; a bad motive is
not necessary, nor will a good one excuse him. He need not
intend to cause any actual harm or loss.33
A false representation made merely by way of a practical joke,
if intended to deceive and to be acted upon so as to produce an
objective fraud, is fraudulent.3 4
It is wrong to obtain payment of a just debt by fraud.3 5
As to the meaning of intention here, some authorities seem to
take the view that intention in the proper sense is necessary,
36
while others seem to hold that the mere probability that objective
fraud will result, i. e., negligence, is enough.
3 7
No doubt intention is usually present, and may usually be
prima facie presumed under the rule that a person is presumed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts; and




'Hollenbeck v. Ristine, io5 Iowa 488, 67 Am. St. Rep. 306, 75 N. W.
355.
Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 13 Eq. 79; Oakes v. Turquand, L. R. 2 H. L.
325; Nash v. Minnesota T. L & Trust Co, 163 Mass. 574, 47 Am. St.
Rep. 489, 4o N. E. lO39; Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y. 454, 20 N. E.
376; Einstein v. Marshall, 58 Ala. 153, 29 Am. Rep. 729.
"Wilkinson v. Downnton (1897), 2 Q. B. 57.
' Blake v. Blackley, io N. C. 257, 26 Am. St. Rep. 556, 13 S. E. 786.
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